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In a landmark trial judgment on April 26, 2012, the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (SCSL) convicted Charles Taylor, former President
of Liberia, of aiding and abetting and planning crimes against human-
ity and war crimes during the armed conflict in Sierra Leone.1 He was
subsequently sentenced to fifty years in prison.2 Taylor’s trial was
high-profile given his status as a former head of state who had been
indicted by the SCSL while he was still president.3 Among other
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1. The oral judgment was rendered on April 26, 2012, summarizing the convictions
and the basis for convictions. See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Out-
reach and Public Affairs Office, Charles Taylor Convicted on All 11 Counts; Sentencing
Scheduled for 30 May (Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx
?fileticket=by3HPDDiFTM%3D&tabid=53. The full written judgment was subsequently
issued on May 18, 2012. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement (May 18, 2012) (becoming one of the longest trial judgments ever issued by an
international criminal tribunal at 2,532 pages).
2. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Sentencing
Judgement, 40 (May 30, 2012).
3. See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office of the Prosecutor,
Statement of David M. Crane, Chief Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone (June 5,
2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=R1tT4d8XW4A%3d&
tabid=196 (last visited Nov. 6, 2012). The website of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
provides background on the trial proceedings:
In August 2003 Charles Taylor resigned as president and went into exile in
Nigeria. He was transferred to the Special Court on 29 March 2006. Due to
concerns about regional security should the trial be held in Sierra Leone,
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things, Taylor was accused of receiving “blood diamonds” from rebels
in Sierra Leone in exchange for arms and ammunition.4 Less attention
has been paid, however, to the gender-related charges against Taylor,
despite the brutal and widespread nature of rape, sexual slavery, and
forced marriage during the conflict.5 Taylor faced an eleven count in-
dictment, including the crimes against humanity of rape and sexual
slavery and the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity.6 He was
also charged with the war crime of committing acts of terror, carried
out by, inter alia, sexual violence.7 He was not accused of carrying out
these crimes himself; rather, he was charged with assisting and en-
couraging, acting in concert with, directing, controlling and/or being
the superior of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the joint RUF-AFRC junta
and/or Liberian fighters.8 On Taylor’s conviction, Prosecutor Brenda
Hollis stated, “Sexual violence against women and girls was a key part
of operations in Sierra Leone. Victims were savagely and repeatedly
raped, and were then used as sex slaves, handed from owner to owner.
The emotional and physical trauma suffered by these victims will con-
tinue for a lifetime.”9
This article will begin by exploring how the trial judgment dealt
with the gender-related charges against Taylor: the crimes against
the Special Court arranged for the trial to be held at The Hague in the
Netherlands. Charles Taylor was transferred to The Hague on 30 June
2006. . . . The Prosecution opened their case on 4 June 2007 . . . . The
Defence . . . concluded on 12 November 2010 . . . .
The Prosecutor vs. Charles Ghankay Taylor, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last visited
Nov. 6, 2012).
4. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Prosecution Final
Trial Brief, ¶¶ 18–21, 341–82 (Apr. 8, 2011).
5. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SIERRA LEONE: “WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY”:
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT 25–27 (2003), available at http://www
.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sierleon0103.pdf. See also PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, WAR-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SIERRA LEONE: A POPULATION-BASED
ASSESSMENT 36 (2002), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/sierra-leone
-sexual-violence-2002.pdf.
6. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Trial Chamber II, Prosecution’s
Second Amended Indictment, 4 (May 29, 2007).
7. Id. at 2, 4.
8. Id. at 2. These groups were often referred to collectively as the rebels. E.g., Erna
Sattler, 2nd Session: 63rd Prosecution Witness Describes AFRC/RUF Attacks and Atroc-
ities Committed, THE TRIAL OF CHARLES TAYLOR (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.charlestaylor
trial.org/2008/10/16/2nd-session-63rd-prosecution-witness-describes-afrcruf-attacks-and
-atrocities-committed/.
9. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor
Hollis Hails the Historic Conviction of Charles Taylor, Special Court for Sierra Leone,
(Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=hCajjMya09g
%3d&tabid=196.
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humanity of rape and sexual slavery, the war crime of outrages upon
personal dignity, and the war crime of committing acts of terror (in-
cluding through sexual violence).10 The approach in the Taylor trial
judgment will be compared and contrasted with the SCSL’s approach
in two earlier trial judgments: Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF trial)11
and Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC trial).12 Next, the article will
explore how the Court viewed the issue of cumulative charges, espe-
cially with respect to rape and sexual slavery. Third, this article will
discuss the modes of liability used to find Taylor guilty and their link
to the gender-related crimes.
Finally, this article will conclude with an evaluation of what the
Taylor trial judgment has added to international criminal law’s under-
standing of gender-based crimes. For example, the judgment has shed
additional light on the different ways in which “rape, sexual slavery,
forced marriages, and outrages on personal dignity” are used in con-
flict by warring parties to assert power and control.13 It also assisted
in solidifying the international legal definition of sexual slavery.14 It
raised important questions about what had previously been termed
“forced marriage” by the SCSL, finding that women and girls had not
actually been forcibly married to RUF and AFRC fighters, but had
been enslaved for the dual purposes of ongoing rape and forced do-
mestic and other labor.15 It therefore proposed that the term “conju-
gal slavery” be used instead of “forced marriage.”16 The Taylor trial
judgment also helped to clarify that an individual may be subject to
convictions for the crimes against humanity of rape and sexual slav-
ery, as well as the war crimes of committing acts of terror and sexual
violence.17 In sum, the Taylor trial judgment was a step forward in
international gender jurisprudence.
I. GENDER-BASED CRIMES IN THE TAYLOR JUDGMENT
Charles Taylor faced a number of gender-related charges, namely
the crimes against humanity of rape and sexual slavery and the war
10. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Trial Chamber II, Prosecution’s
Second Amended Indictment, 2, 4 (May 29, 2007).
11. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement (Mar. 2, 2009).
12. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement (June 20, 2007).
13. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 2035
(May 18, 2012).
14. Id. ¶¶ 418–21.
15. Id. ¶¶ 425–26.
16. Id. ¶¶ 428–30.
17. Id. ¶¶ 6989–90.
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crimes of outrages upon personal dignity and committing acts of terror
(including through sexual violence).18 This section will explore each
crime in turn, examining what the Taylor trial judgment added to in-
ternational criminal law’s understanding of those crimes. It is im-
portant to understand, however, that the Taylor trial judgment was
the fourth trial judgment issued by the SCSL—after the AFRC trial,
the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) case, and the RUF trial.19 The Taylor
trial judgment therefore benefitted from the previous legal analysis
undertaken in those cases, which allowed it to confirm, expand, and
clarify international criminal law on gender-based crimes.20
A. Rape
The Taylor trial was the third SCSL case to hear evidence of
widespread rape during the conflict in Sierra Leone; the CDF case did
not hear evidence of rape, as a majority of the Trial Chamber rejected
a request by the Prosecutor to amend the CDF indictment to add this
and other gender-based crimes.21 The first case, documenting atroci-
ties committed by AFRC troops, discussed the use of gang rape as a
tactic within the conflict.22 The second case considered the use of rape
by the RUF, and concluded that the rebel group employed gang rape,
multiple rapes, rape with weapons and other objects, rape in public,
rape in which family members were forced to watch, and forced rape
between family members or among captured civilians to accomplish its
strategic goals.23 The Taylor judgment expanded somewhat on these
factual findings. It confirmed that the RUF and AFRC were both re-
sponsible for the rape of civilian women and girls, but it added that
other affiliated fighters were also responsible.24 The Trial Chamber
18. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Trial Chamber II, Prosecution’s
Second Amended Indictment, 4 (May 29, 2007).
19. About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
http://www.sc-sl.org/ABOUT/tabid/70/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
20. Kelly Askin, Charles Taylor Judgment: A Victory for Gender Justice, OPEN SOCIETY
FOUNDATIONS (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.soros.org/voices/charles-taylor-judgment-victory
-gender-justice.
21. Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Trial
Chamber I, Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 6,
87 (May 20, 2004). For a critique of this decision and its substantial after-effects, see
Valerie Oosterveld, The Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Consideration of Gender-Based
Violence: Contributing to Transitional Justice?, 10 HUM. RTS. REV. 73 (2009).
22. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial
Chamber II, Judgement, ¶¶ 1031–35 (June 20, 2007).
23. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial
Chamber I, Judgement, ¶¶ 1181, 1185, 1193–94, 1205–07, 1289 (Mar. 2, 2009).
24. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶¶ 913–14, 919, 930–32, 961, 966, 970–72, 980, 984, 992, 999, 1007, 1015–16
(May 18, 2012).
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also added more detail, finding that no one was safe; young and old
alike were subjected to abduction or capture and rape, and previous
societal taboos were ignored, for example, in the targeting of breast-
feeding mothers.25 The Taylor judgment also confirmed that both
groups used a variety of rape tactics, ranging from gang rape, to rape
in public or in the midst of other civilian captives, to sexual mutila-
tion (for example, with sticks), to rape accompanied by beating, in-
cluding beating on the genitals.26
As was the case in the AFRC and RUF trial judgments, the
evidence in Taylor contained many illustrations of how rape did not
occur in isolation; rather, it was often accompanied by a multitude of
other violations.27 Murder, abduction, mutilation (including sexual
mutilation), forced nudity, sexual slavery, forced labor, forced mar-
riage, and physical assault often occurred alongside rape.28 For ex-
ample, in 1998 a young girl named Finda Gbamanja was captured
along with her family by an RUF soldier named Peppe in Baima
Town.29 When her parents tried to seek her release, Peppe beat her
mother and killed her father.30 He then took Gbamanja to Koidu
Town, where he raped her.31 This caused her to bleed and become so
weak that she could not stand.32 Subsequently, Peppe took Gbamanja
to his sister, and his sister forced Gbamanja to work alongside other
RUF “bush wives” (women and girls who were forcibly assigned as
“wives” to fighters and were expected to submit to rape and provide
forced labor).33 One day, when she was harvesting pepper for Peppe’s
sister, she was taken by another soldier named Sergeant Foday, who
kept her as his “wife,” raping her every night.34 The Taylor trial judg-
ment also highlighted that rape by AFRC and RUF fighters was not
accidental: it was inextricably linked to how these groups achieved
their military and political objectives.35
25. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 894, 903, 980–81, 992.
26. Id. ¶¶ 895, 903, 927, 989.
27. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶¶ 896–97, 901, 903, 923–28, 1002–04 (May 18, 2012); Prosecutor v. Sesay,
Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, ¶¶ 1195, 1205,
1208 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial
Chamber II, Judgement, ¶¶ 989–1009 (June 20, 2007).
28. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶¶ 896–97, 901, 903, 923–28, 1002–04 (May 18, 2012).




33. Id. ¶¶ 424, 890. See also infra Part I.B (exploring the “bush wife” phenomenon
in the Sierra Leone conflict).
34. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶ 890 (May 18, 2012).
35. Id. ¶ 6787.
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The legal analysis of rape in Taylor also helped to advance inter-
national criminal law. In line with its earlier approach in the AFRC
trial judgment,36 and with the approach of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor v. Kunarac,37
the Taylor Trial Chamber adopted these elements of crime for rape:
i. The non-consensual penetration, however slight, of the vagina
or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or by any
other object used by the perpetrator, or of the mouth of the
victim by the penis of the perpetrator; and
ii. The perpetrator must have the intent to effect this sexual
penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the
consent of the victim.38
Interestingly, the SCSL’s other Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber I,
adopted slightly different and more detailed elements for rape in the
RUF case based on a combination of the elements set out in the
International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) Elements of Crimes and the
ICTY’s Kunarac elements:
i. The Accused invaded the body of a person by conduct result-
ing in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body
of the victim or of the Accused with a sexual organ, or of the
anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any
other part of the body;
ii. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force
or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress,
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against
such person or another person or by taking advantage of a
coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against
a person incapable of giving genuine consent;
iii. The Accused intended to effect the sexual penetration or acted
in the reasonable knowledge that this was likely to occur; and
iv. The Accused knew or had reason to know that the victim did
not consent.39
The joint Taylor/AFRC approach is slightly narrower than the
RUF approach. On the actus reus element, all of the approaches cover
vaginal, oral, or anal penetration of a victim by a perpetrator, but the
36. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶ 693 (June 20, 2007).
37. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgement, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
38. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶ 415 (May 18, 2012).
39. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, ¶¶ 144–45 (Mar. 2, 2009).
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RUF approach additionally covers situations in which a perpetrator
uses a finger to effect penetration, or a male victim is forced to use his
penis to penetrate (either vaginally, orally, or anally) a male or female
perpetrator.40 The Taylor trial judgment does not provide an explana-
tion as to why it followed the slightly narrower AFRC approach rather
than that of the RUF. That said, the RUF trial judgment also did not
provide any explanation as to why it took a different approach from
that in the earlier AFRC trial judgment. As Erikkson notes, it is per-
plexing as to why, in the discussions of the applicable law on rape, the
two Trial Chambers did not acknowledge and address the differing
approach of the other.41
The Taylor trial judgment also served a confirmatory role on the
law with respect to rape. For example, the judgment noted, in agree-
ment with the AFRC and RUF trial judgments, that the actus reus
element for rape may require reliance on circumstantial evidence.42
This is so because of the context of rape on a large scale in an armed
conflict and the fact that many of the victims of rape may suffer social
stigma.43 As well, the Taylor trial judgment, like the RUF trial judg-
ment, recognized that certain individuals can never be said to have
consented to sex due to age, disability, illness, or being under the in-
fluence of a substance.44
40. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶ 415 (May 18, 2012); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial
Chamber I, Judgement, ¶ 145 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu,
Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 693 (June 20, 2007). In the
Taylor/AFRC elements, it is not clear that the term “object” includes a body part such as
a finger, unlike the RUF approach, which refers to “any other part of the body.” Prosecutor
v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 415 (May 18, 2012);
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement,
¶ 145 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial
Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 693 (June 20, 2007). Further, the Taylor/AFRC elements do not
account for a male victim being forced to penetrate his perpetrator. Prosecutor v. Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 415 (May 18, 2012); Prosecutor
v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, ¶ 145
(Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial
Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 693 (June 20, 2007).
41. MARIA ERIKSSON, DEFINING RAPE: EMERGING OBLIGATIONS FOR STATES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 398–403 (2011).
42. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, ¶ 149 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial
Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 416 (May 18, 2012); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu,
Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 695 (June 20, 2007).
43.  Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, ¶ 149 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial
Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 416 (May 18, 2012); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu,
Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 695 (June 20, 2007).
44. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶ 416 (May 18, 2012); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial
Chamber I, Judgement, ¶ 148 (Mar. 2, 2009).
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One way in which the Taylor trial judgment was regressive, how-
ever, was in the decision of the judges (and, initially, the Prosecutor)
to restrict the consideration of sexual violence crimes to those com-
mitted against women and girls.45 The Taylor indictment referred spe-
cifically to “women and girls” as victims of the sexual violence crimes,
and the Trial Chamber found that this restrictive reference could not
be considered to have been subsequently corrected to include men and
boys.46 This was because the Prosecutor did not provide the accused
with subsequent timely, clear, and consistent notice that the criminal
acts charged included sexual violence directed against men and boys.47
While this mirrored the decision made in the AFRC trial judgment by
the same Trial Chamber,48 it was the opposite of the decision taken by
Trial Chamber I in the RUF trial judgment.49 That Trial Chamber
found that the Prosecutor had provided enough clear, timely, and con-
sistent notice of sexual violence crimes directed against men and boys
to cure the defect in the indictment.50 As a result, the RUF trial judg-
ment contained evidence of sexual violence directed against men and
boys.51 It also recognized that rape directed against women and girls
had effects on men and boys, disempowering the male members of the
community by showing that they “were unable to protect their own
wives, daughters, mothers, and sisters.” 52 The RUF trial judgment,
but not the AFRC trial judgment nor the Taylor trial judgment, helped
to draw attention to a still-overlooked form of gender-based violence
in conflict.53
45. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶¶ 124–34 (May 18, 2012); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Trial
Chamber II, Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, at 5 (May 29, 2007).
46. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶¶ 124–34 (May 18, 2012); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Trial
Chamber II, Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, at 5 (May 29, 2007).
47. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶¶ 124–34 (May 18, 2012).
48. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶¶ 968–69 (June 20, 2007).
49. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, ¶¶ 1303–04 (Mar. 2, 2009). This discussion occurs in the section addressing
outrages upon personal dignity, but is applied by the Trial Chamber more broadly. See, e.g.,
id. ¶ 1347 (discussing the use of sexual violence as a form of terror, and including sexual
violence against men in the description).
50. Id. ¶¶ 1303–04.
51. See, e.g., id. ¶ 1302 (describing how rebels ordered a couple to have sexual inter-
course in the presence of captured civilians, including their daughter, and then forced that
daughter to wash her father’s penis). The RUF Trial Chamber found that this severely
humiliated all of the victims involved. Id. ¶ 1305.
52. Id. ¶ 1350.
53. For further discussion, see Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lost in Translation: UN
Responses to Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys in Situations of Armed Conflict,
92 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 259 (2010); Sandesh Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence Against
Men in Armed Conflict, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 253 (2007).
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B. Sexual Slavery, Forced Marriage, and Conjugal Slavery
Some of the most significant gender-related developments in the
Taylor case are found in the court’s consideration of sexual slavery
and, as part of that discussion, forced marriage or conjugal slavery.
The Taylor trial judgment helped to solidify the international defini-
tion of sexual slavery, as well as contributed to defining the contours
of the crime, for example, as a continuing crime.54 It also provided
analysis distinguishing between what had been called “forced mar-
riage” and what it termed “conjugal slavery.” 55 This discussion raises
crucial questions about how best to capture the widespread practice
during the Sierra Leone conflict in which rebels forcibly assigned girls
and women to commanders and soldiers for the purposes of sexual
slavery and forced domestic labor.
The SCSL entered the first-ever international criminal convic-
tions for the crime against humanity of sexual slavery.56 The RUF
trial judgment was the first one to enter convictions in this respect,
and the Taylor trial judgment was the second.57 The AFRC trial
judgment discussed sexual slavery but dismissed the sexual slavery
charges for duplicity, and it therefore did not enter any convictions.58
The AFRC, RUF and Taylor cases presented a united approach in the
determination of the elements of the crime of sexual slavery, albeit
in slightly different wording.59 The Taylor approach defined sexual
slavery as:
i. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching
to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by
54. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶¶ 418–21 (May 18, 2012).
55. Id. ¶ 429.
56. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor
Welcomes Convictions in RUF Appeals Judgement (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www
.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ITUGDfogLfQ%3D&tabid=53. Sexual slavery was first
listed as a crime against humanity and a war crime in the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998,
then was incorporated as a crime against humanity into the SCSL Statute adopted in 2002.
See Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing
International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 607, 626 (2004). The ICTY had earlier consid-
ered enslavement carried out through sexual means in Kunarac. Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Case No. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement, ¶ 541 n.1333 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).
57. See Press Release, supra note 56; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T,
Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶¶ 6994(a)(v), 6994(b)(v) (May 18, 2012).
58. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶ 696 (June 20, 2007).
59. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶ 418 (May 18, 2012); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial
Chamber I, Judgement, ¶ 158 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case
No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 708 (June 20, 2007).
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purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or per-
sons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty;
ii. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in
one or more acts of a sexual nature;
iii. The perpetrator intended to engage in the act of sexual slav-
ery or acted with the reasonable knowledge that this was
likely to occur.60
The first two elements, representing the actus reus, are based on
those for sexual slavery in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes document.61
It is clear that the Prosecutor must prove, first, that the accused “exer-
cised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over”
a person or persons and, second, that the enslavement involved sexual
acts.62 In Taylor, Trial Chamber II was careful to follow this order of
determination by focusing initially on the enslavement and then on
the sexual aspect.63 Interestingly, the Trial Chamber observed that the
sexual slavery system in Sierra Leone had a hierarchy of ownership,64
thereby illustrating that the context of ownership may differ within—
and not only between—situations.
There are other ways in which the Taylor trial judgment played
a confirmatory role with respect to international law on the crime
of sexual slavery. For example, like the RUF trial judgment, it
adopted the detailed list of indicia of enslavement set out in the
ICTY’s Kunarac case: “control of the victim’s movement, control of
their physical environment, psychological control, measures taken
to deter escape, use or threat of force or coercion against the victim,
duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and
abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour.” 65 The Taylor trial judg-
ment also confirmed that victims do not need to be physically con-
fined in order to be considered enslaved; it suffices that the victims
60. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 418
(May 18, 2012).
61. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 419
(May 18, 2012); INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 8 (2011), available at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/Elements
OfCrimesEng.pdf.
62. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 418
(May 18, 2012).
63. See, e.g., id. ¶ 1144 (“[T]he perpetrators intentionally exercised powers of ownership
over their victims . . . and in all of the cases the victims were forced to engage in acts of a
sexual nature . . . .”).
64. Id. ¶ 2175 (“[T]he Trial Chamber has found that there was a recognized system of
ownership and hierarchy among captured women in the rebel forces in Freetown and the
Western Area . . . .”).
65. Id. ¶ 420; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial
Chamber I, Judgement, ¶ 160 (Mar. 2, 2009) (citing Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-
96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement, ¶ 543 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001)).
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remain under the control of their captors because they have nowhere
to go and they fear for their lives.66 In addition, it stated that payment
or exchange (for example, of money) is not required to establish the
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership,67 thereby help-
ing to settle a question that had arisen in the minds of some during
the negotiations on the ICC’s Elements of Crime.68
The Taylor trial judgment considered the mens rea requirement
for enslavement (which also applied to the subset of sexual slavery).69
The Prosecutor had argued that the mens rea required that the ac-
cused “either intended enslavement or acted in the reasonable knowl-
edge that it was likely to occur . . . .” 70 The Trial Chamber disagreed,
finding that this would represent an expansion of the required mens
rea.71 The Trial Chamber’s approach conforms to the elements adopted
(which say “[t]he perpetrator exercised these powers intentionally”)72
and ICTY jurisprudence,73 but the Prosecutor’s argument follows the
jurisprudence of the ICC, perhaps because the elements for both en-
slavement and sexual slavery were borrowed from the ICC.74 The Trial
Chamber preferred the narrower view as making more legal sense:
“[I]t is difficult to envisage what the requirement of ‘acting in the
reasonable knowledge that enslavement was likely to occur’ would en-
tail in the context of enslavement where the actus reus requires exer-
cising the powers of ownership.” 75 This discussion certainly raises the
larger question of what role the jurisprudence of other international
criminal tribunals should play within the SCSL.
Another development in the Taylor trial judgment included the
recognition of sexual slavery as a continuing crime.76 This recognition
is significant because it reflects the reality of the crime. Sexual slavery
is not made up of one discrete event; it comprises a number of actions
that can stretch over a long period of time and in multiple geographic
66. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 420
(May 18, 2012).
67. Id.
68. See Oosterveld, supra note 56, at 608.
69. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶¶ 419–20 (May 18, 2012).
70. Id. ¶ 449.
71. Id. ¶ 450.
72. Id. ¶ 446.
73. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgement, ¶ 122 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
74. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 346 (Sept. 30, 2008) (stating that
both intent and knowledge are required for the subjective elements of sexual slavery).
75. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 450
(May 18, 2012).
76. Id. ¶¶ 119, 1018.
18 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 19:007
locations.77 The Taylor trial judgment observed that, in the context of
the conflict in Sierra Leone, perpetrators of sexual slavery often moved
between villages and districts as the war front shifted, taking their
sexual slaves with them.78 This recognition also had a very practical
effect: the Trial Chamber stated that the Prosecutor cannot be ex-
pected to plead specific locations for this crime in the indictment.79
Finally, perhaps the most contentious—though perhaps also the
most groundbreaking—development came in the Trial Chamber’s
discussion of the linkages between sexual slavery and what had
been termed “forced marriage” in the AFRC and RUF judgments.80
In the AFRC and RUF cases, the Prosecutor had brought charges
under the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts to cover
the “bush wife” phenomenon, in which captured or abducted civilian
girls and women were forcibly assigned to RUF and AFRC command-
ers and soldiers and expected to submit to sexual intercourse when-
ever demanded, as well as expected to provide domestic and other
services, such as cooking, cleaning, child-bearing and child-rearing.81
There was no actual marriage, even though these girls and women
were called “wives.” 82 These “wives” were often subjected to extreme
violence.83 It appears that the Prosecutor viewed forced marriage as
encompassing two kinds of harm: first, the harm caused by the non-
consensual conferral of the status of “marriage” on the victim and
the resulting personal damage (especially societal stigmatization);
and second, the physical and psychological harms associated with the
rape, forced pregnancy, forced labor, and other duties associated with
being a “wife.” 84
77. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF SLAVERY, ¶¶ 30, 47, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998) (noting that sexual slavery often involves forced
marriages and labor which likely span longer periods of time, and highlighting jurisdic-
tional concerns given the fact that sexual slavery often crosses geographic borders).
78. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 119
(May 18, 2012).
79. Id. ¶ 119, 1018.
80. Id. ¶¶ 425–30; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial
Chamber I, Judgement, ¶ 2307 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu,
Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶¶ 703–04 (June 20, 2007).
81.  Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, ¶¶ 152, 164 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No.
SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶¶ 13–18 (June 20, 2007) (Sebutinde, J.,
concurring).
82. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶ 701 (June 20, 2007). See also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 77, ¶¶ 8,
10, 30.
83. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals
Chamber, Judgement, ¶¶ 190–91 (Feb. 22, 2008).
84. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶ 701 (June 20, 2007).
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A majority of the AFRC Trial Chamber did not accept the Prosecu-
tor’s categorization of forced marriage as an inhumane act.85 Rather,
it found that forced marriage was completely subsumed within the
crime against humanity of sexual slavery, and it dismissed the forced
marriage charge for redundancy.86 It disagreed that two kinds of harm
were captured within forced marriage: “Not one of the victims of sex-
ual slavery gave evidence that the mere fact that a rebel had declared
her to be his wife had caused her any particular trauma, whether
physical or mental.” 87 Even if there had been such evidence, the Trial
Chamber stated that “it would not by itself have amounted to a crime
against humanity, since it would not have been of similar gravity to
the [other crimes against humanity in the SCSL Statute].” 88 These
conclusions were, however, rejected on appeal.89 The Appeals Chamber
found that forced marriage was not subsumed within sexual slavery
and appeared to accept the Prosecutor’s two-pronged explanation of
harm as the imposition of the label of “wife” (and resulting stigmati-
zation) plus physical and psychological mistreatment as a “wife.” 90 It
defined forced marriage as:
a situation in which the perpetrator through his words or conduct,
or those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, compels a
person by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal
partner resulting in severe suffering, or physical, mental or psycho-
logical injury to the victim.91
It agreed with the Prosecutor’s contention that forced marriage is cor-
rectly classified under the crime against humanity of inhumane acts,
85. Id. ¶ 713.
86. Id. This is partly the fault of the Prosecutor, who strongly focused on the sexual
aspects of the forced marriages, including classifying the forced marriage charges under
the heading “Sexual Violence” in the indictment and referring interchangeably to forced
marriage and sexual slavery in the Final Trial Brief. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu,
Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶ 51 (Feb. 18,
2005); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Prosecution Final
Trial Brief, ¶¶ 1868–69, 1871 (Dec. 6, 2006).
87. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶ 710 (June 20, 2007). This demonstrates that the Prosecutor likely did not ask
all of the questions required of the victim-witnesses, especially with respect to stigmatiza-
tion. However, the expert evidence pointed to this stigmatization. See id. ¶ 13 (Sebutinde,
J., concurring). The Prosecutor should have better linked the harms identified by the ex-
pert to the harms experienced by the victim-witnesses. Id.
88. Id. ¶ 710.
89. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals
Chamber, Judgement, ¶ 195 (Feb. 22, 2008).
90. Id.
91. Id. ¶ 196.
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though it declined to enter fresh convictions.92 Trial Chamber I, in the
RUF case, followed the approach of the SCSL’s Appeals Chamber on
forced marriage.93
While Charles Taylor was not charged with forced marriage as
an inhumane act, the Prosecutor did introduce evidence of the “bush
wife” phenomenon to support the sexual slavery charges.94 Since it
was considering evidence of forced marriage, albeit as proof of sexual
slavery, Trial Chamber II took the opportunity to express its views
again on forced marriage.95 It began by finding that the Prosecutor
had erred in charging forced marriage under the crime against hu-
manity of inhumane acts.96 It (correctly) characterized the term “forced
marriage” as a misnomer because there is no actual marriage: “The
Trial Chamber does not consider the nomenclature of ‘marriage’ to
be helpful in describing what happened to the victims of this forced
conjugal association and finds it inappropriate to refer to their perpe-
trators as ‘husbands.’ ” 97 The Trial Chamber identified two harms
that it felt were originally meant to be captured by the term “forced
marriage”: sexual slavery and enslavement through forced domestic
and other forms of labor.98 It thus proposed the term “conjugal slavery”
instead to capture these harms.99 However, it stressed that conjugal
slavery is not meant to be a new crime—it is merely two different
forms of enslavement captured under one heading.100
Even so, the Trial Chamber muddied its description as it tried to
explain the parameters of conjugal slavery. It seems clear that con-
jugal slavery is composed of both sexual and non-sexual aspects, all
of which qualify as enslavement.101 Conjugal slavery is not limited to
92. Id. ¶¶ 200, 202. The Appeals Chamber did not enter fresh convictions because
it was:
convinced that society’s disapproval of the forceful abduction and use of
women and girls as forced conjugal partners as part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack against the civilian population[ ] is adequately reflected by
recognising that such conduct is criminal and that it constitutes an “Other
Inhumane Act” capable of incurring individual criminal responsibility in
international law.
Id. ¶ 202.
93. See id.; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial
Chamber I, Judgement, ¶ 1473 (Mar. 2, 2009).
94. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶¶ 422, 1101, 1700 (May 18, 2012).
95. Id. ¶ 424.
96. Id.
97. Id. ¶¶ 425–26.
98. Id. ¶ 424.
99. Id. ¶¶ 427–28.
100. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 430
(May 18, 2012).
101. Id. ¶ 427.
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sexual slavery.102 However, the Trial Chamber then referred to the
forced labor aspect as “a descriptive component of a distinctive form
of sexual slavery,” as opposed to enslavement.103 While the initial
description of conjugal slavery seemed to bring both sexual slavery
and enslavement through forced labor under one descriptor, this ex-
planation seems to be trying to singularly slot the forced labor aspects
into sexual slavery, an approach that had been rejected by the SCSL’s
Appeals Chamber.104 That said, the actual practice of the Taylor Trial
Chamber in considering evidence of conjugal slavery reflects the
clearer explanation of the “conjugal slavery = sexual slavery + forced
labor” formula.105 In attempting to be so thorough in its explanation
(despite being confusing), the Trial Chamber may have been worried
that others would interpret its identification of conjugal slavery as a
new crime, or as straying outside of the charges, and therefore subject
to challenge under the principle of legality.106
With the Taylor trial judgment, there are now two different ap-
proaches within the SCSL on how to address the “bush wife” phe-
nomenon, which therefore raises some questions as to which is the
best approach. In some respects, the Taylor approach is better. One
of the strongest criticisms of the forced marriage approach was that
it misnamed and miscategorized the crime.107 On misnaming, the
main critique is that, while the name itself refers to marriage, no
marriage, as defined by international human rights law or domestic
Sierra Leonean law, was involved.108 In Sellers’s view, the reference to
marriage is “linguistic camouflage.”109 On miscategorization, Sellers
102. Id. ¶ 428.
103. Id. ¶ 429. In this vein, the Trial Chamber continued:
The Trial Chamber considers that unlike the concept of “forced marriage,” as
it was presented by the Prosecution in the AFRC and other cases before this
Court, conjugal slavery is not a new crime with additional elements. Rather
it is a practice with certain additional and distinctive features that relate to
the conjugal aspects of the relationship between the perpetrator and the vic-
tim, such as the claim by the perpetrator to a particular victim as his “wife”
and the exercise of exclusive sexual control over her, barring others from sex-
ual access to the victim, as well as the compulsion of the victim to perform
domestic work such as cooking and cleaning.
Id. ¶ 430.
104. Id.; Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals
Chamber, Judgement, ¶ 195 (Feb. 22, 2008).
105. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶¶ 427–28 (May 18, 2012) (considering the sexual evidence under sexual slavery and the
forced labor evidence under enslavement).
106. Id. ¶¶ 429–30 (stressing that the Trial Chamber was not creating a new crime).
107. Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A “New” Crime Against Humanity?,
8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 53, 65–66 (2009).
108. Id.
109. Patricia Viseur Sellers, Wartime Female Slavery: Enslavement?, 44 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 115, 130 n.97, 137, 142 (2011).
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has convincingly argued that all of the evidence put forward about
forced marriage in the SCSL cases fits the definition of the crime
against humanity of enslavement.110 The Taylor approach comes
close to this by splitting the classification of what had previously
been termed forced marriage into evidence of the existing crimes (and
charges) of sexual slavery and enslavement, thus satisfying nullum
crimen sine lege.111 In identifying two forms of enslavement as part of
conjugal slavery, the Trial Chamber also avoided the miscatego-
rization of the “bush wife” phenomenon as a purely or mainly sexual
crime: clearly, it has both sexual and non-sexual components, both of
which are important.112 In fact, one of the most important outcomes
of the Trial Chamber’s approach is that it draws attention to the fact
that the category of gender-based crimes contains much more than
just crimes of sexual violence. In Sierra Leone, women and girls were
subjected to gender-based crimes by being forced into highly gendered
labor roles; as “bush wives,” they fetched water, pounded rice, har-
vested palm oil, cooked meals, looked for food, carried loads, cleaned
houses, fished, planted seeds, and weeded.113 In other words, the
Taylor trial judgment recognizes that enslavement through forced
labor can be a gendered crime. Thus, the term “conjugal slavery” may
have some clear expressive benefits over the term “forced marriage.”114
On the other hand, the term “conjugal” may also not be ideal,
depending on how it is interpreted in the future by other courts and
tribunals. The SCSL Appeals Chambers described the different roles
in the conjugal relationship: the “wife” was expected to provide sex
on demand, domestic labor, childbearing and child care, while the
“husband” was to provide food, clothing and protection, including pro-
tection from rape by other men.115 While this described the highly
gendered roles within the “bush wife” scenario during the conflict in
110. Id. at 135.
111. For discussion on the opinion that the forced “marriage” approach did not satisfy
nullum crimen sine lege, see Bridgette A. Toy-Cronin, What Is Forced Marriage? Toward
a Definition of Forced Marriage as a Crime Against Humanity, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
539, 580–81 (2010); Nicholas A. Goodfellow, The Miscategorization of ‘Forced Marriage’ as
a Crime Against Humanity by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 INT’L. CRIM. L. REV.
831, 848–53 (2011).
112. Valerie Oosterveld, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers, and Forced
Marriage: Providing Clarity or Confusion?, 45 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 131, 155 (2007).
113. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶¶ 1697–99, 1704, 1766, 1799, 1810–11 (May 18, 2012).
114. As Cook and Cusack note, naming is an important expressive tool of the law,
helping to authoritatively transform a previously legally unacknowledged experience
into acknowledged wrongs. REBECCA COOK & SIMONE CUSACK, GENDER STEREOTYPING:
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 39 (2010).
115. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals
Chamber, Judgement, ¶ 190 (Feb. 22, 2008).
2012] GENDER AND THE CHARLES TAYLOR CASE 23
Sierra Leone, there is a risk that this could also become the meaning
of “conjugal” within international criminal law.116 It is important that
the meaning of the term be kept both flexible and wide, so as to adapt
to the context and to capture different scenarios: where a woman and
a man are forced together into conjugal slavery (as was the situation
under the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia);117 where two women or two
men are forced together into conjugal slavery; where the victim and
the perpetrator are the same sex; and where the perpetrator is female
and the victim is male.118
Another concern about moving from an understanding of forced
marriage to that of conjugal slavery is that it is not immediately obvi-
ous that the latter captures one part of the harm initially identified
by the Prosecutor: the harm caused by the non-consensual conferral
of a status of “wife” and the resulting damage, especially societal
stigmatization.119 The argument is that the “wife”-victims suffered a
unique harm caused by being “affiliated in such an intimate way
with a member of one of the warring parties,” and it is for this reason
that they are ostracized by many within Sierra Leone society as col-
laborators.120 For some, this was the most important facet of forced
marriage.121 The SCSL Appeals Chamber found that there was a
distinction between the conferral of the label “bush wife” and the
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership.122 Even so, it
appears that this distinction does not necessarily mean that the
conferral of the label “bush wife” can never amount to the exercise
116. See, e.g., Binaifer Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible: Post-Conflict
Justice for Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 102 (2005) (“The
Prosecutor and the court should take care that patriarchal gender stereotypes . . . are
not inadvertently incorporated into jurisprudence . . . .”).
117. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nuon, Ieng, Khieu & Ieng, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-
OCIJ, Closing Order, ¶¶ 842, 845, 848 (Sept. 15, 2010). The Extraordinary Chambers in
the Court of Cambodia have similarly described forced marriage as a situation in which
the victims were forced to enter into conjugal relationships in coercive circumstances.
Id. ¶¶ 1442–47.
118. Nowrojee, supra note 116, at 102; Oosterveld, supra note 112, at 158–59; Toy-
Cronin, supra note 111, at 579, 581; Michael P. Scharf & Suzanne Mattler, Forced
Marriage: Exploring the Viability of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s New Crime
Against Humanity, 23 (Case Research Paper in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 05-35,
2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=824291.
119. Neha Jain, Forced Marriage as a Crime Against Humanity: Problems of Definition
and Prosecution, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1013, 1031 (2008); Oosterveld, supra note 112, at
158; Beth Van Schaack, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: 2008 Year-In-Review, 7 NW. J. INT’L
HUM. RTS. 170, 205 (2009).
120. Van Schaack, supra note 119, at 227; See also Hon. Teresa Doherty, Developments
in the Prosecution of Gender-Based Crimes—The Special Court for Sierra Leone Experience,
17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 327, 331 (2009); Nowrojee, supra note 116, at 102.
121. Toy-Cronin, supra note 111, at 576.
122. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals
Chamber, Judgement, ¶ 190 (Feb. 22, 2008).
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of ownership powers. However, what is not clear is whether the re-
sulting stigmatization would also be considered part of the exercise
of ownership powers.
The Taylor sentencing judgment described sexual slavery and
rape as “particularly reprehensible.”123 The Taylor trial judgment has
made a solid contribution to international criminal law’s understand-
ing of sexual slavery through its definition and consideration of sex-
ual slavery as a continuing crime. In particular, it has raised some
fundamental questions about the SCSL’s previous consideration of
forced marriage, and has proposed a new category of conjugal slavery
to jointly capture sexual slavery and strongly gendered forms of forced
domestic labor.124
C. Outrages Upon Personal Dignity
Taylor was charged with outrages upon personal dignity as a war
crime.125 The Trial Chamber defined the elements of that crime, adopt-
ing a similar approach to the earlier AFRC and RUF judgments and
the ICC’s Elements of Crimes:
i. The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated
the personal dignity of the victim;
ii. The humiliation, degradation or other violation was so seri-
ous as to be generally considered as an outrage upon per-
sonal dignity;
iii. The perpetrator intentionally committed or participated in an
act or omission which would be generally considered to cause
serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a serious
attack on human dignity; and
iv. The perpetrator knew that the act or omission could have
such an effect.126
By confirming the elements of crime in a manner consistent with
earlier judgments, the Taylor trial judgment helped to solidify inter-
national criminal law’s approach to this war crime.
123. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Sentencing
Judgement, ¶ 75 (May 30, 2012).
124. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶ 428 (May 18, 2012); Amy Palmer, Note, An Evolutionary Analysis of Gender-Based War
Crimes and the Continued Tolerance of “Forced Marriage,” 7 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS., 133,
133–34 (2009).
125. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Trial Chamber II, Prosecution’s
Second Amended Indictment, 4–5 (May 29, 2007).
126. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶ 431 (May 18, 2012); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial
Chamber I, Judgement, ¶ 175 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case
No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 716 (June 20, 2007); INT’L CRIMINAL
COURT, supra note 61, at art. 2(b)(xxi).
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Outrages upon personal dignity include rape and sexual slav-
ery, but they are not limited to those acts.127 Other examples include
forced nudity and threats of sexual mutilation.128 The Taylor trial
judgment helped to further define the parameters of this war crime
by finding that these sorts of acts could be aggravated by adding a
public or additionally humiliating or degrading aspect.129 The Trial
Chamber listed a number of examples of aggravated forms of outrages
upon personal dignity: sexual mutilation through insertion of objects
(such as wood) into a victim’s vagina; forced undressing as a prelude
to rape; and public humiliation combined with rape, such as rape
where neighbors, community members or family members (includ-
ing husbands and children) are forced to watch.130 One illustration of
the latter is found in evidence describing the rape of a victim in front
of her child and other captured persons.131 By definition, outrages
upon personal dignity humiliate, degrade, or violate the dignity of
the victim.132 The Taylor trial judgment has added a welcome nuance
to this war crime by highlighting ways in which that humiliation or
degradation might be heightened, presumably a factor to take into
account in sentencing.133
D. Committing Acts of Terror
Charles Taylor was charged with the war crime of committing
acts of terror.134 While this war crime is not usually perceived to be
127. The SCSL Statute refers to “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humil-
iating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent
assault.” Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
137 (entered into force Apr. 12, 2002). The Statute of the Special Court is annexed to this
Agreement. Essential Court Documents, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://
www.sc-sl.org/DOCUMENTS/tabid/176/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
128. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgement, ¶ 16 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) (describing
a victim who was forced to dance naked on a table); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-
95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, ¶ 40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Dec. 10, 1998) (recalling how the accused’s subordinate threatened to put his knife inside
a victim’s vagina).
129. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 1196
(May 18, 2012).
130. Id.
131. Id. ¶ 1200(iii).
132. Id. ¶ 431.
133. Note that this was not explicitly dealt with in the Taylor sentencing, though it
was inherent in the list of factors. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial
Chamber II, Sentencing Judgement, ¶¶ 19–20 (May 30, 2012).
134. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Trial Chamber II, Prosecution’s
Second Amended Indictment, 2 (May 29, 2007).
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a gendered crime, the SCSL’s Prosecutor charged it as such, alleg-
ing that the way in which the acts of terror were perpetrated were
through the other crimes charged in the indictment, including the
sexual violence charges.135 The Prosecutor therefore had to prove the
underlying conduct and demonstrate that these underlying acts were
carried out with the intent to spread fear.136 In the RUF trial judg-
ment, Trial Chamber I had carefully considered the role of sexual and
gender-based violence in the RUF’s military and political strategy.137
It found that sexual and gender-based violence was a crucial part of
the overarching war strategy of the RUF.138 In particular, “acts [of
sexual violence] were not intended merely for personal satisfaction
or a means of sexual gratification for the fighter.”139 Instead, they
were part of the RUF’s plan, first to create “an atmosphere in which
violence, oppression and lawlessness prevailed,” and then to adopt
a “calculated and concerted pattern” of sexual and gender-based
violence, including many forms of rape, sexual slavery and forced
marriage.140 The RUF knew that in Sierra Leone victims of these
crimes were likely to be severely stigmatized and ostracized from
their communities.141 This isolated the victims, destroyed families,
and unraveled “cultural values and relationships which held the so-
cieties together.”142 The outcome of this violence was to effectively
disempower the civilian population and to instill fear in entire com-
munities.143 The RUF Trial Chamber found that through these actions
the accused had demonstrated the specific intent to terrorize the
civilian population,144 which was upheld on appeal.145
The Taylor Trial Chamber took a similar approach. It began by
acknowledging the RUF Trial Chamber’s conclusions: “It is well es-
tablished that rape, sexual slavery, forced marriages, and outrages
on personal dignity, when committed against a civilian population
135. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II,
Prosecution Final Trial Brief, ¶ 716 (Apr. 8, 2011).
136. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶ 403 (May 18, 2012).
137. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, ¶ 1348 (Mar. 2, 2009).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. ¶¶ 1347, 1351.
141. Id.
142. Id. ¶¶ 1348–49.
143. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, ¶¶ 1348, 1351 (Mar. 2, 2009).
144. Id. ¶ 1125.
145. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgement, ¶ 990 (Oct. 26, 2009).
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with the specific intent to terrorise, amount to an act of terror.”146
It also concluded that sexual violence committed by the RUF, AFRC,
RUF-AFRC junta and affiliated fighting forces was “deliberately
aimed at destroying the traditional family nucleus, thus undermining
the cultural values and relationships which held society together.”147
It found that sexual violence was not merely a means of sexual grati-
fication; rather, it was a deliberate tactic on the part of the perpetra-
tors to spread terror among the civilian population, which is why the
violence often took place in public.148 The “widespread and systematic
use of women as sex slaves” also “instilled fear and a sense of inse-
curity among the civilian population . . . .”149 However, in the Trial
Chamber’s view, not all prohibited acts could be considered as tools
of terror.150 Some acts do not have the primary purpose of terrorizing,
such as the recruitment and use of child soldiers, enslavement, and
pillage.151 This is because the recruitment and use of child soldiers was
primarily done to meet military needs; the enslavement of civilians
was to meet utilitarian goals (such as to secure diamonds); and the
pillaging was encouraged in order to maintain the forces (who were
not otherwise paid).152
The RUF and Taylor approaches to the war crime of committing
acts of terror have set important precedent. They have uncovered the
critical role of sexual and gender-based violence in the rebels’ pur-
suit of power, and they demonstrated that seemingly gender-neutral
crimes can be carried out in a gender-specific manner or can have
gendered outcomes.153 However, it should be noted that the AFRC
Trial Chamber had earlier come to the opposite conclusion, finding
that sexual violence was not used to spread terror among civilians, but
it was rather “committed by the AFRC troops to take advantage of the
spoils of war, by treating women as property and using them to sat-
isfy their sexual desires and to fulfil other conjugal needs.”154 This
explanation is disappointing. It is true that rape can be committed
146. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 2035
(May 18, 2012).
147. Id.
148. Id. ¶ 2035–38.
149. Id. ¶ 2053.
150. Id. ¶ 1967.
151. Id.
152. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶¶ 538, 1968, 1976 (May 18, 2012).
153. See, e.g., Valerie Oosterveld, The Gender Jurisprudence of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone: Progress in the Revolutionary United Front Judgments, 44 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 49, 71 (2011).
154. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶ 1459 (June 20, 2007).
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in conflict for many reasons, including for opportunistic reasons,155
but it is also an expression of power: the categorization of rape as lust
is outdated and inaccurate.156 Since the same Trial Chamber decided
the AFRC and Taylor judgments, it appears that the additional evi-
dence put forward in the Taylor case helped to change its conclusion
in this regard.
II. CUMULATIVE CHARGES
One of the issues considered by the Taylor Trial Chamber was
whether it could enter convictions both for the crimes against human-
ity of rape and sexual slavery, or for the war crimes of committing acts
of terror and sexual violence.157 The underlying consideration was
whether it could use essentially the same criminal conduct to convict
Taylor of different crimes under the SCSL Statute.158 These types of
convictions are referred to as “cumulative convictions” and are per-
mitted only when:
each statutory provision involved has a materially distinct ele-
ment not contained in the other . . . . If an additional element is
only required for one of the provisions and not for the other, then
the Trial Chamber can only enter a conviction for the more spe-
cific offence, as it necessarily entails the commission of the less
specific offence.159
The question arose in connection to the crimes against humanity of
rape and sexual slavery because sexual slavery often involves multiple
rapes.160 Trial Chamber I, in the RUF trial judgment, had previously
concluded that the prohibited acts of rape and sexual slavery contain
differing elements:
The offence of rape requires sexual penetration, whereas sexual
slavery requires the exercise of powers attaching to the right of
ownership and acts of sexual nature. As the acts of a sexual nature
155. Xabier A. Aranburu, Sexual Violence Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Using Pattern
Evidence and Analysis for International Cases, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 855, 860 (2010).
156. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
DIALOGUES 144–45 (2006).
157. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 6988
(May 18, 2012).
158. Id. ¶ 6987.
159. Id. This is also the approach of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. See Prosecutor v. Krsti, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement,
¶¶ 218, 223–27, 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
160. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶¶ 421, 6989 (May 18, 2012).
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do not necessarily require sexual penetration, and rape does not
require that the right to ownership is exercised, the Chamber
finds that sexual slavery is distinct from rape.161
Nevertheless, it then went on to find that “[w]here the commis-
sion of sexual slavery, however, entails acts of rape, . . . the act of rape
is subsumed by the act of sexual slavery. In such a case, a conviction
on the same conduct is not permissible for rape and sexual slavery.”162
In other words, when sexual slavery is evidenced by rape, a conviction
is permitted only on sexual slavery.163
In the Taylor trial judgment, Trial Chamber II disagreed and
found that it is permissible to enter convictions for the crimes against
humanity of both sexual slavery and rape, regardless of whether the
sexual slavery involved rape.164 It adopted a wider reading of the dis-
tinct nature of the elements required for the prohibited acts:
While both are forms of sexual violence, each offence contains a
distinct element not required by the other. The offence of rape
requires non-consensual sexual penetration. The definition of
rape does not require that the perpetrator exercise ongoing con-
trol or ownership over the victim, as is required by the crime of
sexual slavery.165
It therefore understood the distinction as complete, and not reliant
on whether the sexual mode of slavery was carried out through rape.
It was enough that the distinction rested on the slavery.166 This
makes legal sense for two reasons. First, it respects the fact that
sexual slavery was meant to capture a cumulative harm that may in-
clude expression through multiple rapes but also includes a distinct
overarching element of ownership, increasing and differentiating
the egregious context of the rapes.167 Second, if the RUF approach
was adopted, it would not permit full acknowledgment of the wrong-
doing of the accused.168 Trial Chamber II did acknowledge that this
161. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, ¶ 2305 (Mar. 2, 2009).
162. Id.
163. Id.




167. Sexual slavery was included in the Rome Statute of the ICC and consequently the
SCSL Statute in order to name this form of enslavement as a crime. See Oosterveld, supra
note 56, at 626.
168. If the RUF approach was followed, then the harms caused by rape could never be
distinguished from the harm caused by a combination of actions resulting in sexual slavery.
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement,
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conclusion was inconsistent with that of Trial Chamber I, but it simply
stated (correctly) that it “is not bound to follow this finding.”169 The
defense has appealed the Trial Chamber’s finding allowing cumula-
tive convictions on rape and sexual slavery, based on the conclusions
of Trial Chamber I in the RUF trial judgment.170 It therefore appears
that this matter will be considered and definitively decided by the
Appeals Chamber.
Following similar reasoning, the Taylor Trial Chamber also held
that cumulative convictions are permitted for the war crime of commit-
ting acts of terrorism and the war crime of outrages upon personal
dignity, as well as crimes against humanity—including rape and sex-
ual slavery.171 The essential element of committing acts of terror is the
intent to spread fear, which distinguishes the offense from other war
crimes which do not have this requirement, and from crimes against
humanity, which require a widespread or systematic attack upon a
civilian population (whereas war crimes require a nexus between the
underlying act and an armed conflict).172 Again, this approach makes
legal sense, as it helps to reflect the full culpability of the accused.
III. THE LINK BETWEEN GENDER-BASED CRIMES AND
TAYLOR’S LIABILITY
Taylor was ultimately found responsible through the aiding and
abetting and planning modes of liability.173 Because he was found
guilty of all charges, including the charges relating to sexual and
gender-based violence, the Trial Chamber needed to establish a link
between him and the commission of the crimes. It did so by finding
that, as early as August 1997, when he became President of Liberia,
Taylor was aware that the RUF, AFRC, RUF-AFRC junta and/or af-
filiated fighting forces were committing various forms of sexual and
gender-based violence.174 For example, he was given an ECOWAS re-
port of the Committee of Four on the situation in Sierra Leone dated
¶ 2305 (Mar. 2, 2009). On the second point, the SCSL has already acknowledged that
“multiple convictions . . . serve to describe[ ] the full culpability of a particular accused
or provide a complete picture of his criminal conduct.” Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara &
Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 2102(i) (June 20, 2007).
169. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 6989
n.15618 (May 18, 2012).
170. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, ¶ 2305 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-A, Notice
of Appeal of Charles Ghankay Taylor, Appeals Chamber, ¶¶ 118–19 (July 19, 2012).
171. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
¶¶ 6988, 6990 (May 18, 2012).
172. Id.
173. Id. ¶¶ 6953, 6971.
174. Id. ¶ 6882.
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August 26, 1997, describing the “massive looting of property, murder
and rapes following the coup by the RUF and sections of the [Sierra
Leone Army]” against the Sierra Leone government on May 25,
1997.175 As well, the Trial Chamber found that he was aware of a
speech to the nation on June 18, 1997, in which the RUF forces apol-
ogized for “the atrocities they [had] committed in Sierra Leone, in-
cluding killings and rapes.”176 The Trial Chamber concluded that
[t]he sole reasonable inference that can be drawn from this evi-
dence is that as early as August 1997, the Accused, as President
of Liberia and a member of the ECOWAS Committee of Five, was
informed in detail of the crimes committed by the AFRC/RUF
members during the Junta period, including murder, abduction
of civilians including children, rape, amputation and looting.177
In light of this, “[h]e would therefore have been aware of the
likelihood that the AFRC/RUF would commit similar crimes in the
future.”178 Additionally, media and international coverage of AFRC
and RUF crimes grew after August 1997, such that, at the time, it was
public knowledge that these groups were committing sexual violence,
among other crimes.179 He was thus presumed to be aware of this pub-
lic knowledge, as evidenced, for example, by a 1998 joint communiqué
issued by Taylor and the President of Sierra Leone that “strongly
condemned the continuing rebel activities in Sierra Leone, as well as
the horrendous atrocities that had been committed there.”180 The Trial
Chamber concluded that, at the time, Taylor “knew of the AFRC/
RUF’s operational strategy and intent to commit crimes,” and he knew
this included rape.181 Because he knew of this operational strategy, the
arms and ammunition he gave to the RUF, AFRC, RUF-AFRC junta
and Liberian fighters constituted direct assistance to the commission
of crimes, including sexual slavery, rape, and outrages upon personal
dignity.182 As well, other forms of assistance similarly amounted to
substantial assistance.183
175. Id. ¶ 6880.
176. Id.
177. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, ¶ 6882
(May 18, 2012).
178. Id.
179. Id. ¶ 6883, n.15477 (listing United Nations, non-governmental and other reports
of sexual violence in Sierra Leone in 1998).
180. Id. ¶ 6884.
181. Id. ¶¶ 6885–86.
182. Id. ¶¶ 6911–12.
183. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement, ¶¶ 6918–19, 6922–24, 6936–37, 6946, 6950, 6953 (May 18, 2012).
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Taylor participated in a plan with the RUF’s Sam Bockarie to
invade Freetown, which included plans for other attacks.184 Knowing
of the operational strategies of the RUF and the other groups,
Taylor either “intended that the crimes charged in Counts 1 to 11 of
the Indictment be committed or was aware of the substantial likeli-
hood that RUF/AFRC forces would commit such crimes as a result of
executing the plan which he and Bockarie designed,” including sex-
ual violence.185 In other words, public and ECOWAS reports of sexual
violence provided Taylor—in Liberia—with knowledge of the actions
of the RUF, AFRC, RUF-AFRC junta and other fighting forces in
Sierra Leone, yet he still provided substantial assistance to and par-
ticipated in planning crimes with these groups. Therefore, the Trial
Chamber found that the necessary links were established between
Taylor in Liberia and the crimes on the ground in Sierra Leone
committed by the RUF, AFRC, RUF-AFRC junta and other fighting
forces.186 It is interesting to note the strong reliance on one ECOWAS
and a number of international reports in establishing this link for
the sexual violence crimes.187
What lesson can be drawn from the way in which the Trial
Chamber made the link between Taylor himself and the gender-
based crimes? It clearly is difficult to link the head of one state with
crimes committed on the ground in another state. The Trial Chamber
therefore needed to rely on reports of gender-based violence: reports
that Taylor received through ECOWAS as President of Liberia, reports
that he was likely to have heard from his security personnel, and re-
ports that were so widely known that they were public knowledge. It
appears that such a high level linkage to sexual violence outside of the
battlefield, and outside of the country in which the conflict occurred,
is unlikely to be proven through insider witnesses, perhaps due to the
“intimate” nature of the crime. This obviously makes contemporane-
ous reporting on sexual violence very important as a possible source
of evidence.
CONCLUSIONS
The Taylor trial judgment has broken new ground, or reinforced
old ground, on a number of key gender-related issues within inter-
national criminal law. In its consideration of rape as a crime against
humanity, the Trial Chamber added helpful detail to the different,
184. Id. ¶¶ 6961–62, 6968.
185. Id. ¶ 6970.
186. Id. ¶¶ 6950, 6971.
187. See, e.g., id. ¶ 44, nn.176–77 & 179–80.
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brutal forms of rape used by the RUF, AFRC, RUF-AFRC junta and
other fighting forces to punish and control the civilian population. It
also demonstrated that rape did not occur in the Sierra Leone con-
flict in a vacuum. Rape was usually accompanied by a multitude of
other violations. On sexual slavery, the trial judgment helped to fur-
ther confirm the definition of the crime and also ensured that it would
be understood as a continuing crime, thereby reflecting the reality
of the victims’ lives. The Taylor trial judgment also raised some key
questions in proposing that international criminal law turn away from
forced marriage and turn to conjugal slavery (a combination of sexual
slavery and gendered forms of forced labor through enslavement).
With regard to rape and sexual slavery, the court concluded that it
was permissible to enter cumulative convictions for these prohibited
acts since they contain distinctly different elements.
The Taylor trial judgment also helped to further define the pa-
rameters of the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity by find-
ing that acts such as rape could be aggravated by adding a public or
additionally humiliating or degrading aspect. Indeed, this is exactly
what the RUF, AFRC, RUF-AFRC junta and other fighting forces did
in carrying out the war crime of committing acts of terror. The Trial
Chamber found that gender-based violence, especially rape and sex-
ual slavery, played a critical role in the rebels’ military and political
strategy of inflicting terror upon the civilian population. The court’s
analysis on this point was an excellent illustration of how seemingly
gender-neutral crimes can be carried out in a gender-specific manner
or have gendered outcomes. Another example of this occurred in the
court’s consideration of how women and girls had been enslaved to
carry out highly gendered forms of domestic work.
Finally, the discussion of Charles Taylor’s liability for gender-
based violence demonstrated how difficult it is to link the head of one
state with crimes committed on the ground in another state. The Trial
Chamber relied heavily on reports—mainly open source reports. In
such cases, this obviously raises the importance of ensuring that there
is accurate, comprehensive and widespread contemporaneous report-
ing on gender-based crimes. Hopefully, the Taylor trial and judgment
have made it possible for more top-ranking leaders to be held to ac-
count, including for gender-based crimes. The influence of the Taylor
trial judgment should not stop there however; there is much in the
judgment to inform all those engaged in the prosecution of crimes
against humanity and war crimes from a gender-sensitive perspective.
